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APPEAL FROM DISTRICT COURT ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
APPELLATE STANDARD OF REVIEW
In their primary briefs both Hebertson and Willowcreek Plaza
failed to clearly state the appellate standard of review when
faced with a trial court's entry of an order dismissing the
complaint under Rule 12 or entering summary judgment under Rule
56.

Under Rule 12(b)(6) the order of dismissal is affirmed only

if it appears to a certainty that Hebertson would not be entitled
to relief under any facts alleged in support of her claims.
Heiner v. S. J. Groves & Sons Co., 790 P.2d 107, 109 (Utah App.
1990).

Moreover, the appellate court must construe all

allegations and inferences in the light most favorable to

Hebertson.

Id.

Similarly, under Rule 56, Hebertson is entitled

to have all the facts and inferences from those facts presented
and considered in the light most favorable to her.

Winegar v.

Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d. 104, 107 (Utah 1991).
INTRODUCTION
The trial court improperly and, at very least, prematurely
dismissed Hebertson7s claim against Willowcreek Plaza.

The

claims against Willowcreek Plaza should be reinstated and
Hebertson should be given an opportunity to present her claim for
compensation.
ARGUMENT
I. THE ACTIONS OF DIME SAVINGS BANK AND VALLEY BANK
& TRUST CONSTITUTE TRANSACTING BUSINESS TOGETHER.
If the language of Rule 17(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure is broken down, the first question that must be
answered is whether Dime Savings Bank and Valley Bank & Trust
were " . . . associated in any business either as a joint-stock
company, a partnership or other association not a corporation . . .".

The evidence presented to the trial court makes it

clear that they were associated together in the business of
owning and operating Willowcreek Plaza at the time Hebertson
fell.
Following the foreclosure of the property it is clear that
the banks had a joint ownership interest in the property.

In

addition, both banks participated in making management decisions
(e.g. appointing Milford Management as the leasing agent) about
the property.

Moreover, Valley Bank was the agent for the
-2-

parties in leasing the space, finding a manager for the property
and collecting and disbursing rental income.

Given these facts

there is little question the relationship between Dime Savings
and Valley falls under the definition of a "joint venture" found
at U.C.A. §48-1-3.1:
A joint venture is an association of two or
more persons to carry on as co-owners of a
single business enterprise.
The statute goes on to state that the Utah General Partnership
Act, U.C.A. §48-1 et. seq., governs the property rights of joint
venturers.

As joint venturers in the single business enterprise

of owning and operation a piece of commercial real estate for a
number of months, it is clear that Valley Bank and Dime Savings
Bank were associating in a business that is not a corporation
under the first step of the analysis under Rule 17(d).

The only

remaining question under that rule is whether the two banks
" . . . transact[ed] such business under a common
name . . .".
II. THE FACTS CLEARLY SHOW THAT DIME SAVINGS BANK
AND VALLEY BANK & TRUST WERE TRANSACTING THEIR BUSINESS
UNDER THE COMMON NAME OF "WILLOWCREEK PLAZA".
Both parties agree "Willowcreek Plaza" was the name of the
complex where the plaintiff fell.
p.3.

Brief of Willowcreek Plaza,

Both parties likewise concede that space was leased at

Willowcreek Plaza

during the time Valley Bank & Trust and Dime

Savings Bank owned the property and that the leases for the space
referred to the complex as "Willowcreek Plaza".

-3-

Willowcreek Plaza simply argues that jointly owning a
commercial property that is held out to the public by a common
name and entering into leases that refer to the property by that
common name do not qualify as transacting business under a common
name as required by Rule 17(d).

Hebertson disagrees.

In support

of her position (and contrary to the bald assertion of
Willowcreek Plaza), there is case law both in Utah and in other
states holding that such activities do constitute transacting
business under a common name.
The case of Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 767 P.2d 499 (Utah
1988), dealt with a claim by the Cottonwood Mall in its common
name as the plaintiff to regain possession of leased property.
The mall was not a corporation or a partnership but was
specifically identified by the Court as a joint venture.

In

responding to the Complaint in Cottonwood Mall, the defendant
moved to dismiss based upon the failure of the plaintiff to name
the individual members of the joint venture as the real parties
in interest under Rule 17(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and the

Supreme Court agreed.

The Court held that Rule 17(d) allowed the

Cottonwood Mall to sue under its common name.
If the relationship between Valley and Dime Savings meets
the definition of a joint venture under U.C.A. §48-1-3.1,
Cottonwood Mall is impossible to distinguish from this case.
Cottonwood Mall compels a ruling that property owned by a joint
venture and known both between the joint venturers and by the
-4-

public as "Willowcreek i}xaza!l ma} It />LH M in Mn(
Moreover, Utah is not alone in so rulinq.

ame.

Approximately

nineteen states have analogous rules of civil procedure or other
statutes tiidt illnv Mill • > h> bioufht 1^ * i i^r-tinst
unincorporated associations.

While the specific wording of the

various rules and statutes varies from state to state, at least
two other states have likewise indicated that suit brought
against an unincorporated association that holds itself out by a
common name is acceptable.

In White v. Cox,

17 Cal.App.3d 824,

830, 95 Cal.Rptr. 259, 263 (1971), the Court held that the

*ner

of a condominium unit injured on the common grounds of the
condominium could sue the unincorporated association of
condominium owners by naming "Merrywood Apartments," the name of
the condominium complex, as the defendant.

In addition, the

Nebraska Supreme Court in the case of Jansen v. Mundt, 30 N.W.
53, 55-56 (Neb. 1886), held that under the terms of its rules of
civil procedure the failure to specifically bring suit in the
name of the individual owners of the business rather than 1 > the
common name of the partnership was not a basis for a motion to
dismiss.

The Court indicated that any remedy for such an

omission was in the nature of a motion requiring that the
pleading be amended rather than to have the case dismissed.
Cottonwood Mall, the California and Nebraska cases and the
express language of Rule 17(d), are persuasive authority for the
argument that naming Willowcreek Plaza as the defendant states a
valid cause of action.

-5-

III. THE FACT THAT DIME SAVINGS AND VALLEY AGREED THAT
VALLEY WOULD CONDUCT BUSINESS AS THE AGENT FOR BOTH DOES NOT
CHANGE THE FACT THAT THE TWO BANKS WERE TRANSACTING BUSINESS
UNDER THE COMMON NAME OF WILLOWCREEK PLAZA.
As stated in the Hebertson's original brief, the fact that
the leases were signed only by Valley Bank rather than by both
Valley and Dime Savings provides no support to the argument of
Willowcreek Plaza.

There is no doubt Valley was acting as agent

for both itself and Dime Savings.

However, that agency

relationship does not alter the fact that the two were doing
business together and that "Willowcreek Plaza" was the name by
which that business was known to the public and to tenants.
Ford v, Williams, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 287, 289, 16 L.Ed. 36, 38
(1858), states::
the contract of the agent is the contract of
the principal, and he may sue or be sued
thereon though not named therein . . .
See Garland v. Fleischmann, 831 P.2d 107, 110 (Utah 1992).
In short, the leases might just as well have had the name of both
Valley and Dime Savings on them as landlords.

The true nature of

the joint venture between Valley and Dime Savings does not cease
to exist just because Valley was the agent for the joint venture.
IV. THE FACTS PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL COURT AND
THE INFERENCES THAT FLOW FROM THOSE FACTS STATE A CLAIM
FOR RELIEF AGAINST WILLOWCREEK PLAZA AND RAISE
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT ABOUT WHETHER VALLEY
BANK AND DIME SAVINGS BANK WERE A JOINT VENTURE
AND TRANSACTED BUSINESS UNDER A COMMON NAME.
Only in the most clear-cut circumstance should a case be
dismissed for failure to state a claim.
Sons Co., su H ra.

Heiner v. S. J. Groves &

The facts presented to the trial court are more
-6-

than sufficient to create a basis to bring a claim against
Willowcreek Plaza in that

name.

They create genuine issues of

material fact d oout the relationship between Valley and Dime
Savings and the extent to which they held out the commerc lal
development to the public by the name "Willowcreek Plaza".
In its brief Willowcreek Plaza argues at some length about
whether Hebertson properly requested time for additional
discovery at the trial court level.

However, Hebertson has never

said that the Motion to Dismiss bet urn thf >i .ai court was
granted regardless of her request for more discovery.

Hebertson

did not ask for additional opportunity to conduct discovery at
the hearing before Judge Rokich, and she does not believe now
that additional time for discovery was necessary.

Hebertson is

arguing that, based upon the information produced for the trial
court, a sufficient factual basis exists to bring a claim Kjainst
"Willowcreek Plaza" under Rule 17(d).

It is also her belief that

additional information will only verify the link between Dime
Savings Bank and Valley Bank & Trust transacting business under a
common name.
The additional information is likely to include
correspondence between the two banks regarding maintenance of the
property, the amount of money coming in, who should manage and
lease the property, the scope of Valley Bank's activities as the
local agent for the two banks, what kind of compensation would be
paid to managers and agents for the property and how it would be
insured.

All of these documents would likely show more clearly
-7-

the fact that the property was known as "Willowcreek Plaza" to
the owners, the tenants and the members of the general public.
In short, there are genuine issues of fact about key questions in
determining whether Valley Bank & Trust and Dime Savings Bank
transacted business under a common name.

In light of this,

whether Willowcreek Plaza's motion to dismiss is treated under
Rule 12 or Rule 56, dismissal of the case was premature at the
very least.
CONCLUSION
Many facts indicate that Dime Savings Bank and Valley Bank &
Trust were associated together in a joint venture and were
transacting business under a common name.

There are no facts or

authority presented by Willowcreek Plaza other than its own
argument to warrant upholding the trial court's order of
dismissal.

The Order should be reversed and Hebertson should be

allowed to present her claim for compensation for the serious
injuries she has suffered.
Respectfully submitted this "2^ day of August, 1994.
KING & ISAACSON

Brian S. King
7
Attorneys for Plainriff/Appellee
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